充电法在复合材料静电测试中的问题

按照GJB2605－96中有关静电衰减性能测试的要求,自制了复合材料静电衰减性能测试装置。用这套测试装置对9种不同结构的复合材料进行了实验研究。研究表明,利用充电法测试材料静电衰减性能时,由于电容效应,测试结果不能正确反映被测材料的静电性能。     

S模糊集与故障树复合分析

运用模糊集评价和概率估计提出一种故障树复合分析方法来评价非常事件,使传统的故障树分析中,类似人为错误的模糊、不精确事件得到有效地处理。     

样条函数康特诺维奇杂交元法在复合材料板弯曲中的应用

本文通过修正余能原理,用三次B 样条函数对应力和位移场进行插值,提出一种新的杂交元,应用离散的康特诺维奇法解决了金属和复合材料的弯曲问题。该法具有收敛快、计算精度高、处理边界条件方便的特点,能得到与位移同一精度的应力解,而且不存在多余零能模式和闭锁问题,是一种解决板弯曲问题的行之有效的计算方法。     

随机动态规划的混合算法研究

针对随机条件下动态规划模型的主要特点,运用智能算法混合编程理论,设计了一种探索多阶段决策问题的智能混合算法.该算法首先将问题转化成一族同类型的一步决策子问题,然后利用随机模拟和遗传算法,依据训练样本形成的训练神经元网络,在单步决策中寻求最优策略和最优目标值,逐个求解,再据初始状态逆序求出最优策略序列和最优目标值.仿真结果表明,该算法具有一定的通用性,初始设计点可以随机产生,其计算精度不因函数的非线性强弱而受影响,对目标和约束的限制较少,可应用于多种形式的随机多阶段决策优化问题,较好地满足了随机动态规划模型求解和优化的要求.     

集中控制混合网络中基于流的资源分配算法

集中控制混合网络中,异构化网络内部的流量具有一定的规律和特性,如果使用原有的单一的离散式最大极值和无状态的网络资源调度算法,忽略了异构网络规律,会造成网络利用率较低、易震荡、部分网络流延迟等问题。通过分析由集中控制网络和普通网络组成的混合网络的拓扑结构,对混合网络结构中常见问题如流闪现、不能估计的流、路径堵塞或连接震荡场景进行分析,并提出基于期望和状态的流量评价资源规划算法POS和POS-FME。算法考虑混合网络的运行状态,对系统可用资源进行评估,为系统中各种流匹配对应可用资源,并具有一定的预测作用,从而避免混合网络出现运行效率低下的场景。通过实验,POS算法和POS-FME算法相对传统算法,利用率提高了10%～30%,并降低了震荡和平均延迟。     

磺化酚醛树脂的研究:高效减水剂的制备及其对混凝土工作度和力学性能的影响

制备了以磺化酚醛树脂为基础的3种高效减水剂,该高效减水剂能显著地减少用水量和改善混凝土工作度以及力学强度.测试结果显示:随掺量的增加,混凝土抗压强度在一定范围内有明显的提高,然后增加较慢或有所下降;混凝土的抗折、抗拉、抗剪强度以及与钢筋的粘接强度均高于对照空白样.同硅灰、磨砂矿渣相结合还获得了抗压强度大于100MPa、流动性好的超高强混凝土.     

固体发动机药柱正交各向异性材料参数灵敏度分析

<正>交各向异性材料已在大型固体发动机上得到广泛应用。为了较大地降低发动机药柱的VonMises应变水平,极大地提高发动机的结构完整性能,以星形药柱为例,对固体发动机药柱推进剂和绝热层的弹性模量和泊松比等正交各向异性材料参数进行了灵敏度分析,得到了固体发动机药柱正交各向异性材料参数的灵敏度系数。分析方法与结论对固体发动机的优化设计具有指导作用。     

基于拉盖尔模型的超声信号渡越时间测量性能分析

传统窄带模型仅能通过数值计算统计出超声信号渡越时间的测量性能。针对这一问题,提出基于拉盖尔模型计算理论克拉下限的方法。研究了拉盖尔函数及其时间导数的性质,得到时间导数内积矩阵,并将其应用到费舍尔矩阵中,能够快速精确计算克拉下限。对混合指数模型仿真表明,在高斯白噪声背景下,渡越时间方差与理论克拉下限具有良好的一致性;受窄带噪声和反射等因素影响,实测数据的渡越时间方差与理论克拉下限存在较大偏差。     

A Novel Framework for Safeguarding Naval Nuclear Material

ABSTRACT

The present international standard allows non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to forego safeguards when nuclear material is used in a “non-proscribed military activity,” though no criteria have been established to determine when NNWS can remove naval nuclear material from safeguards. Though at present, only nuclear-armed states possess nuclear submarines, the global nuclear naval landscape may soon change with the advancement of Brazil's fledgling program and the possible precedent it would set for other NNWS. A framework is needed to shore up nuclear security and prevent nuclear material diversion from the nuclear naval sector. Proposed and existing nonproliferation frameworks, including a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and commitments through the nuclear security summits, are insufficient to close this loophole. A Naval Use Safeguards Agreement (NUSA), modeled after the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would provide a framework to remove the opacity surrounding nuclear material in the naval sector. Designed for NNWS and encouraged as confidence-building measures for nuclear weapon states, NUSA would explicitly outline those stages in the naval nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are to be applied and in what context. This viewpoint also further provides direction for targeted research and development in technical naval nuclear safeguards solutions.     

FACILITATING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: Verified Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks and Production

Unprecedented interest in seeking progress toward nuclear disarmament exists today; even some nuclear weapon states are looking for new ways to strengthen this process. National declarations of fissile material holdings—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—could play an important role in supporting this effort, facilitating not only transparency but also the irreversibility of the process. This article discusses what kind of content such declarations could have in order to be meaningful and effective, the sequence of data on fissile material holdings that states might release, and some of the challenges to be expected in reconstructing historic fissile material production; it also summarizes current attitudes of weapon states toward making such declarations. Initial declarations can be valuable as confidence-building measures, but better and more background data are necessary if declarations are to serve as the groundwork for deeper cuts in the nuclear arsenals. A robust verification approach would ultimately require inspectors to have access to fissile material production and storage sites. The methods and tools of nuclear forensic analysis—in this context also dubbed nuclear archaeology—would be a key element of this process. This article discusses the capabilities and limitations of potential approaches to verifying declarations of historic production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium; it also identifies and discusses opportunities for further research and development.